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Abstract: The EU has many different 'faces' in international relations. It is not only 
an emerging diplomat, but also a fierce trade negotiator and one of the most 
important partners in international development cooperation. This diversity of roles 
makes for equally diverse and ambiguous external relations. The EPA negotiations 
and the emerging 'Aid for Trade' agenda, where the EU is both friend and foe of the 
developing countries provide particularly clear examples of the tensions in the EU's 
external policies. This diversity and the resultant ambiguity is difficult to model 
theoretically, and most theoretical approaches are consequently based on a 
simplified version of the EU as international actor. The proposed paper seeks to 
develop an alternative conceptualisation of the EU as an international actor based on 
foreign policy analysis and historical institutionalism. Specifically, Walter Carlsnæs’ 
integrative analytical framework for foreign policy analysis is adapted and applied to 
analyse the EPAs as an EU foreign policy initiative. The EU is analysed as a political 
system comprising several relatively independent policy sub-systems, in which 
different political coalitions compete for the right to define the specific policy 
objectives of the EU. In this conceptualisation, the EU is a compartmentalised and 
therefore contingent international actor. 
 
 
The many faces of Europe 
The European Union has many faces in international relations. It is not only the 
single most important provider of grant funding for developing countries; it is 
also a renowned and feared international trade negotiator, representing the 
world’s largest trade block, and an emerging political heavyweight, with high-
profiled political delegations in hot spots all over the world and an increasing 
number of military operations.
3 The different faces of the EU are not always 
speaking the same language, which in turn makes the EU a relatively 
“ambiguous” international actor. The ongoing negotiations over Economic 
                                                 
1 This is very much a draft and should be treated accordingly. Comments are most welcome (jespil@um.dk).  
2 The author obtained his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen in March 2006, and is 
currently Deputy Head of Mission at the Royal Danish Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia. The views expressed in this article do 
not represent the official view of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
3 See e.g. Pilegaard & Rasmussen (2006).  
  1Partnership Agreements (EPA) provide an interesting example of the different 
faces of Europe, and how they interact in practice.  
 
The EPAs are in principle an integral part of the Cotonou Agreement and thus an 
important element in the EU’s development policy. However, as Regional Free 
Trade Agreements, the EPAs are also an integral part of the EU’s overall trade 
policy. Similarly, as the arguably most important vehicle for the EU’s partnership 
with the developing countries, the EPA negotiations also have a fairly substantial 
political content. The tensions between the different elements are apparent: In 
the EPA negotiations, the EU is pitched as both friend and foe of the ACP 
countries. On the one hand, the EU is presumably committed to boosting ACP 
exports to the rest of the world, including the European market (i.e. the 
development agenda); on the other, it is pursuing a mixture of defensive and 
offensive trade interests, with scant regard for the “development” impact this has 
in the ACP countries.  
 
The EPA negotiations have provoked much criticism, with both developing 
countries and Western NGOs berating the EU for its aggressive approach to the 
trade negotiations with the ACP countries. In the eyes of some commentators, 
the EU is essentially trying to pry open the fragile markets of the ACP countries 
and reintroduce the shipwrecked WTO ‘Singapore issues’ through the regional 
EPAs. In the daily press of several ACP countries, the EU is thus portrayed as bull 
in a china shop, forcing defenceless ACP trade ministers to lower their tariffs.
4 
Similar images are common in the Western NGO community.
5 The irony should 
be readily apparent: The flagship Cotonou Agreement that makes the EU the 
world’s most important and generous development partner is simultaneously 
                                                 
4 See e.g. ”COMESA’s Dr. Tekere expresses concern over the EPAs”, The Post, 23rd January 2007. 
5 See e.g. ”Brussels’ blind spot: The lack of coherence between poverty eradication and the EU’s other policies”, 
APRODEV, 1999, and “Dumping on the poor”, CAFOD, 2002. Oxfam is also quite direct in its choice of report titles, e.g. 
“The Great EU Sugar Scam” and “Blood on the floor” (Oxfam briefing papers 27 and 82, respectively) 
Jennar (2004) 
provides another example. 
  2showing the EU brutishly protecting and promoting narrow European trade and 
investment interests. What Europe gives with the one hand, it takes away with 
the other.
6  
 
The present paper will attempt to shed some light on the apparent tensions by 
analysing the EPA negotiations as foreign policy action emanating from a highly 
compartmentalised and consequently contingent international actor. The 
following section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of a number of 
existing approaches to the study of EU external relations. On the basis of this 
discussion, the paper suggests an alternative approach inspired by Walter 
Carlsnæs’ integrative analytical framework for the study of foreign policy, and 
historical institutionalism. The rest of the paper presents an analysis of the 
development of the EPA proposal focussing on the tensions in the process. 
Finally, a few concluding reflections and observations are presented.  
 
Modeling the EU as an international actor 
A number of researchers have argued that the European Union can and should 
be studied as a relatively capable international actor.
7 Where traditional 
intergovernmentalist theory would claim that the EU is – at best – a negotiated 
actor, i.e. an entity whose external policies and actions reflect the different 
bargains of the largest member states, the EU-as-actor approach conceptualizes 
the Union as a (relatively) coherent actor, emphasizing that the external actions 
of the Union can not and should not be reduced to a mechanical summary of the 
national positions of the dominant member states. Charlotte Bretherton and John 
Vogler thus argue that the European Union is an actor sui generis that should be 
studied in its own right.
8 Hazel Smith makes an even bolder claim by arguing 
                                                 
6 ”What future for development policy?”, Action Aid (2004).  
7 In addition to the authors discussed directly in the text, see also Rye Olsen (2005) and Ravenhill (1985), who views the 
EU as the patron vis-à-vis the ‘collective clientilism’ of the ACP countries. See also White (2003:7-8) for a discussion.  
8 Bretherton & Vogler (1999:44).  
  3that 1) the EU does have a foreign policy, and 2) this policy can in principle be 
analysed using much the same analytical tools that one would employ in 
analysing French or British foreign policy.
9 Hazel Smith thus start from the 
premise that the Union ‘…is an important actor in world affairs and that it makes 
and implements foreign policy and that it does this as a complex but relatively 
cohesive actor’.
10  
 
The external policies of the Union may reflect some degree of inconsistency or 
even incoherence, but the broader picture emerging is that of a capable and 
knowledgeable actor pursuing a number of relatively well-ordered and prioritized 
interests. For researchers working with EU-as-actor models, the interesting 
question is therefore not why coordination sometimes fails, but rather why it 
works so well most of the time. The external policies of the European Union are 
often short-sighted and rarely sufficiently co-ordinated internally or with the 
policies of the member states. However, in these respects the EU does not differ 
significantly from any other international actor. Even the most centralised 
government will experience occasional problems of co-ordination and have 
difficulties in reconciling conflicting objectives. If the sovereign member states 
are unable or unwilling to ensure coherence and consistency in their policies, one 
can hardly fault the European Union for failing to ensure coherence and 
consistency.
11
 
                                                 
9 Smith (2002:1ff). There are, according to Smith, ‘…no conceptual difficulties and few practical difficultes to the idea of 
the European Union possessing a foreign policy much the same as that of the nation state.’ (p.7).  Similarly, Karen E. 
Smith defines foreign policy to mean ‘…the activity of developing and managing relations between the state (or, in our 
case, the EU) and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests of the state or actor in 
questions’ (Smith 2003:2). Karen E. Smith thus basically imports the EU into a traditional mould for studying a state’s 
foreign policy. 
10 Smith (2002): 10. 
11 Given their analytical focus, these researchers are obviously less concerned with the general coherence debate. The 
index in Bretherton & Vogler’s volume includes a number of references to coherence and especially consistency. In Hazel 
Smith’s work, however, neither coherence nor consistency figure in the index. 
  4The most obvious limitation of the EU-as-actor approach is that fact that it 
operates at a general level of analysis, focusing on the longer-term macro-
patterns of the EU’s external relations, while neglecting the details of policy 
analysis.
12 This is obviously an informed choice, which authors like Bretherton 
and Vogler explicitly address. It is somewhat reminiscent of the debate between 
researchers using traditional realist/systemic (‘black-box’) models of state 
behaviour and foreign policy analysts, who place much greater emphasis on the 
domestic sources of external policies: What is the more important – the fact that 
an authoritative decision was ultimately made or how it was arrived at? This 
question can not be answered in the abstract but must be addressed by the 
researcher in connection with a specific research project. Still, by insisting on the 
appropriateness of treating the Union as a unitary actor, these approaches are 
open to the general criticism leveled against ‘black box’ models of foreign policy, 
such as the pronounced tendency to rationalize foreign policy behaviour ex 
post.
13  
 
The theoretical assumptions informing the analysis of the EU as an international 
actor are not innocent choices. On the contrary, they have significant 
consequences for the manner in which the external behaviour of the Union is 
interpreted, and hence the moral and political value judgments we pass on the 
EU as an international actor. If the EU is modelled as a unitary actor, with the 
capacity for making informed choices in its external relations, then it may rightly 
be faulted for being hypocritical: Underneath the political rhetoric of sustainable 
development and partnership, it deliberately marginalises developing country 
exports in order to shelter its domestic agricultural producers. If, on the other 
                                                 
12 White (2001); White (2003). See also Rosamond (2000). Bretherton & Vogler are obviously aware of this limitation, 
which reflects a clear and reasoned choice of analytical focus. They are not blind to the importance of policy analysis, but 
have chosen to emphasize the whole rather than the individual parts.  
13 Basically reasoning that whatever the EU does, it must be a rational response to a clear objective. See also the 
discussion in Carlsnæs (2004) and Ginsberg (2001).  
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14, the 
Union is perhaps better depicted as a tragedy: The actors involved in the system 
understand the negative consequences of the Common Agricultural Policy on 
third parties in the developing world, but they are unable to move from the 
present deadlock. These are not the only theoretical conceptualisations on offer, 
but the two extremes may serve to underline the importance of the theoretical 
agenda. The challenge in the present context is to find a theoretical model that 
can encompass both the notion of purposive, goal-oriented EU foreign policy 
actions, and the tensions and contradictions that exist within the Union as a 
foreign policy actor.  
 
An alternative theoretical framework: Foreign Policy Analysis 
As an alternative to the theoretical approaches discussed above, the present 
section outlines the contours of an alternative theoretical framework, inspired by 
Walter Carlsnæs’ work on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).
15 For hardened EU 
scholars, it may seem heretical to import FPA models into the discussion of EU 
external relations, but to the extent that the EU may be analysed as a political 
system using the traditional tools of comparative government and policy-
analysis
16, it would seem logical to extend the same reasoning to the realm of 
external relations and apply the tools of FPA.   
 
The analytical framework developed by Carlsnæs consists of three dimensions: 
The structural, the dispositional and the intentional. Together, these three 
dimensions may be used to provide a comprehensive explanation of foreign 
policy actions. The intentional dimension basically explains ‘why’ a given actor 
chose a particular course of action; a specific foreign policy action. This 
dimension is clearly teleological: The intentions actors have are relevant when 
                                                 
14 Scharpf (1988); Héritier (1999). See also Daugbjerg (1999) for an application.  
15 Carlsnæs (1986; 1992; 2004).  
16 See e.g. Richardson (2001); Hix (1994).   
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tendency to explain actions with direct reference to material constraints and 
opportunities, it is worth emphasising the importance of this dimension: Foreign 
policy actions presuppose agency. Structures may compel actors to act in a 
certain way, but they do not produce actions.
17  
 
The dispositional dimension opens up for a causal analysis of the intentions 
behind foreign policy actions. The goals and preferences informing a given 
actor’s course of action may be explained at a ‘deeper’ level, by investigating the 
factors that disposed the actor to hold the preferences that motivated her or his 
foreign policy actions.  
 
The structural dimension represents the ‘deepest’ level of analysis, opening up 
for a causal analysis of how structures both constrain and enable agency. This 
should not be taken to imply that any given foreign policy action may 
mechanically be reduced to a set of structural determinants. The structural 
dimension does not determine the dispositional dimension, nor does the latter 
mechanically control the intentions of the foreign policy actors. The relationship 
is both constraining and enabling. Drawing of critical realism, it may be argued 
that the structural dimension in some ways limits the possible systems of 
meaning (i.e. the dispositional dimension). This is the ‘materialist principle’ 
advocated by Andrew Sayer: ‘Whichever system of meanings societies adopt, 
they must satisfy certain basic material needs in order to survive’.
18  
 
The tripartite analytical framework proposed by Carlsnæs offers the possibility of 
working with several different ‘types’ of explanation within a common integrative 
model: A given foreign policy actions may be explained by invoking the motives 
of the decision-makers, which in turn may be explained causally by tracing their 
                                                 
17 Calsnæs (1992:253).  
18 Sayer (1997:34), emphasis in original.    
  7logical relationship to broader dispositions. The dispositions are not merely social 
constructions, however, and they may consequently be explained causally by 
analysing their relationship to the structural dimension. 
 
Transferring the model to the study of EU foreign policy actions 
Carlsnæs’ integrative framework was developed for the study of single unit 
foreign policy actions, but this should not necessarily preclude its application to 
the study of EU foreign policy actions. In a recent conference paper, Carlnæs 
thus proposed a four-step recipe for transferring the model to the study of the 
EU: 
1.  Determine the foreign policy action (i.e. the explanandum). In this case, 
the explanandum are the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements: an 
explicit EU undertaking that clearly targets a group of identified countries. 
2.  The logical starting point must be a ‘specification of the intention(s) 
behind the undertaking in question’, the rationale being that it is 
impossible to ‘describe purposive actions without invoking the reason(s) 
for them’.
 19  
3.  The next step advocated by Carlsnæs is a causal analysis to ‘determine 
why certain purposes, goals, preferences or choices have been invoked, 
but not others’.  
4.  Finally, the analysis must invoke structural factors as constraining and 
enabling characteristics that to some degree determine the dispositions of 
decision-makers.  
Carlsnæs thus assumes that the analytical approach can be applied to the study 
of a collective actor such as the EU without major problems. The following 
section will attempt to use Carlsnæs’ integrative framework along the lines 
delineated above in an analysis of the developments and decisions leading to the 
EPA negotiations.  
                                                 
19 Carlsnæs (2004:14).  
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The Economic Partnership Agreements 
Having defined the foreign policy action to be explained, the following sections 
go through the three steps suggested by Carlsnæs in an analysis of the proposed 
EPAs.  
 
Step two: Establishing motive 
In order to establish the motive behind the EPA proposal, it may be instructive to 
survey the discussions leading to the development of what would eventually 
become the Cotonou Agreement.  
 
The 1995 Mid-Term Review of Lomé IV demonstrated that the majority of the EU 
member states were highly critical of the results achieved by 2 decades of 
preferential ACP access to the EU market. The MTR was thus conducted in an 
atmosphere of growing disillusionment and mounting dissatisfaction with the 
Lomé regime.
20 Echoing these concerns, the Commission’s 1996 Green Paper on 
the future of EU development assistance offered a strikingly grim assessment of 
the Lomé Conventions.
21 Nearly everyone could agree that the system had been 
a disappointment.
22 The dismal record of the preference regime had an obvious 
impact on the discussions. No matter how the data was presented or interpreted, 
                                                 
20 Pilegaard (2006: 152ff.) 
21 European Commission (1996). The Green Paper was prepared by DG Development, who at this point in time had 
responsibility for all aspects of EU-ACP relations, including trade. See also McQueen (1998:671); Raffer (2001:10). Even 
the traditional pillars of support, i.e. the French Government, seemed unwilling to expend much further capital in defence 
of the policy; suggesting that the MTR had dispelled any French illusions that the policy could somehow be kept on track. 
See McQueen (1998: 673); Ravenhill (2002:14); Dickson (2004:51). See also, more generally, Panagariya (2002a); 
Salama & Dearden (2001:26); Yu & Vig Jensen (2005:378); Forwood (2001). There are, however, important dissenting 
voices in the debate, including Dickson (2004), who argues that the case against trade preferences has been overstated. 
See Dickson (2004:47). 
22 Yu & Vig Jensen (2005:378). However, the causes offered as explanations of the unimpressive record of the Lomé’s 
trade provisions were varied, as were the lessons extracted from the experience. The point deserves emphasis, for the 
statistical evidence of the poor trade performance of the ACP countries could in principle have been used in other 
agendas than the dismantlement of the Lomé regime.  
  9it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the trade provisions of the successive 
Lomé Conventions had failed to deliver the promised benefits.
23 As argued by 
Anna Dickson, ‘[t]hese generally pessimistic results [were] seen to confirm ‘the 
unimportance of being preferred’ and […] led to disenchantment with trade 
preferences as a means of assisting developing countries.’
24 Against this 
background, it is hardly surprising that the general thrust of the Green paper was 
‘…to dismiss the idea of renewing the Lomé Convention.’
25 Still, the Green Paper 
was officially supposed to stimulate a wider debate on the different options 
available for the future of the EU-ACP relationship, and the Commission 
consequently drew up a number of different scenarios.
26 From the Commission’s 
perspective, Lomé IV could in principle be followed by any one of the following 
arrangements:  
1.  Simple renewal (i.e. status quo with a few adjustments).  
2.  Abolition (i.e. making Lomé an umbrella Convention, devoid of actual 
content, which would subsequently be negotiated bilaterally).  
3.  Splitting the Lomé regime into smaller Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
with regional groupings of ACP countries; 
4.  Ad hoc arrangements with different groups of countries of individual 
countries (including, for example, special preferential arrangements 
with the LDCs).  
 
According to ODI Senior Researcher Sheila Page, who followed the process quite 
closely, it was ‘…clear that the Commission had decided that the first was to be 
                                                 
23 Dickson (2004:46). Judging from the raw data alone, they would actually seem to have had a detrimental impact on 
the competitiveness of the ACP economies. Data thus suggests that countries that have benefited from non-reciprocal 
preferences (market access without having to open own market) have fared substantially worse than countries that have 
simultaneously opened their domestic markets to foreign competition. See Brenton (2000:16). 
24 Dickson (2004:46). The general disenchantment with the Lomé Convention was arguably part of a broader feeling of 
fatigue in the international development cooperation community.  
25 McQueen (1998:672).  
26 European Commission (1996). See also Forwood (2001:427).  
  10rejected as not acceptable to the WTO.’
27 A continuation would have required a 
waiver from the WTO rules, and the Commission had apparently decided ‘…not 
to make the negotiation effort and concessions which would have been 
necessary to continue.’
28 As such, the Green Paper was clearly inspired by the 
parallel negotiations in the WTO. The member states agreed that any future 
arrangements would eventually have to be made compatible with the WTO rules 
(i.e. be non-discriminatory or transformed into Regional Free Trade Agreements). 
However, significant differences emerged over the length of the transition 
periods that were deemed necessary. The second option, simply discontinuing 
the special relationship, was never seriously considered, and in the immediate 
situation the Union and the ACP states agreed to join efforts in obtaining a new 
waiver from the WTO.
29  
 
Interest centred on the third option, which would satisfy the criterion of WTO 
compatibility. However, it was clear from the discussions that none of the 
delegations were particularly keen on the idea. The UK and the Netherlands had 
the most serious reservations, arguing that the proposal was logically flawed and 
impracticable.
30 The Nordic countries were equally unenthusiastic, and kept 
trying to extend the discussions from the ACP grouping to the broader group of 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs). France accepted the EPA idea as a poor 
‘second best’, and was generally supported on this by the Southern member 
                                                 
27 Page (2000).  
28 Page (2000). See also McQueen (1998:670). Whether the EU actually could have negotiated a more permanent 
solution to the compatability issue is debatable. Dickson (2004:57) puts the point succinctly: ‘As the world’s largest 
trading bloc, it seems unlikely that the EU did not have the capacity to alter or adjust the interpretation of WTO rules to 
benefit more developing countries. It seems that political will was lacking’. See also Ravenhill (2003) for a similar 
assessment. See also Hewitt & Whiteman (2004:146); Page (2000). Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan (1998:viii) offer a more 
pessimistic assessment, stressing the difficulties in obtaining a waiver. 
29 The existing waiver obtained for Lomé IV bis in 1995 would expire in February 2000 (Salama & Dearden (2001:9)).  
30 Forwood (2001:428-429; 435). Impact assessments of the proposed EPAs had been commissioned, but it wad 
apparent that they would not be finalised in time. The decision would consequently have to be taken without detailed 
impact studies. See also Patrick A. Messerlin ‘L’Afrique et l’Union européene renégocient le cadre de leurs échanges’, Le 
Monde, 8th September 1998. 
  11states.
31 As holder of the Presidency, the United Kingdom was keen on obtaining 
an agreement, lest negotiations with the ACP states be postponed. The EPAs 
were arguably the only element the different parties could agree to,
32 the 
remaining differences centring on the length of the transition phases and the 
future of the agricultural commodity protocols. On the former, there was general 
agreement that the concerns of the ACP should be allowed to set the pace. The 
EU was thus prepared to accept the longest possible transition phase before 
moving to full reciprocity.
33
 
In summary, Lomé IV was coming to an end, and a new framework for 
development and trade cooperation with the ACP countries had to be developed. 
The objective or motive behind the development of the proposals that would 
eventually constitute the trade chapter of the Cotonou Agreement was to find a 
workable alternative to the Lomé regime and the system of discriminatory trade 
preferences it embodied. The Economic Partnership Agreements were 
unenthusiastically accepted as a supposedly viable compromise solution to the 
different demands that were being voiced at the time.  
 
Step three: Explaining preferences through dispositions 
The third step is to explain the preferences of the EU as a collective actor by 
analysing the dispositions of the actors involved: Why were certain goals invoked 
and not others? Why was the issue of WTO compatibility allowed to overshadow 
all other concerns? Again, the analysis of the EU differs from the analysis of a 
                                                 
31 According to Solignac Lecompte (1999) the EPAs were probably the best chance the French government had of 
rescuing the basic contours of the privileged relationship with Africa (‘…la solution qui sert le mieux le projet politique de 
l’Europe pour ses relations avec les ACP, lui-même indissociable du projet de la France pour ses relations avec l’Afrique.’ 
(p.2)).  
32 Forwood (2001: 431).  
33 Philippe Lemaitre ’Négotiations tendues pour le renouvellement de la convention de Lomé’, Le Monde, 2nd March 1999. 
See also Holland (2002 :188).  
  12single foreign policy unit, and it is consequently necessary to make a few 
theoretical observations about the character of the EU as a foreign policy unit.  
 
The EPAs straddle a number of distinct EU policy areas, including trade, 
development and agriculture. These policy fields were developed under different 
circumstances and the basic organising principles and political objectives of the 
EU’s sector policies reflect different historically contingent compromises.
34 The 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) was essentially part and parcel of the decision 
to establish a common market within a single customs union.
35 The European 
Community was to a large extent based on a vision of a ‘Europe without 
borders’, where people, goods, and capital could move freely. In the Treaty of 
Rome, multilateral trade liberalisation was seen not only as being instrumental in 
promoting trade-led economic growth in the EC, but as a value in itself.
36 The 
Commission was given exclusive competence to negotiate on behalf of the 
member states, and the CCP had its baptism by fire in the midst of a multilateral 
round of trade talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).
37 The following round of GATT talks (the Kennedy Round) saw the 
European Commission in a much more prominent role, where the President of 
The Commission, Jean Rey, was ‘able to negotiate as if he were the 
representative of a single state’.
38
 
The establishment of the EC development policy was a much more haphazard 
affair. Indeed, there was no logical reason for the EC being engaged in 
international development cooperation. However, during the negotiations over 
the Treaty of Rome, the French government insisted on including some element 
                                                 
34 Pierson (1995); Kay (2003).  
35 See Bretherton & Vogler (1999: 47).  
36 Hoeller, Girouard & Colecchia (1998:§2) 
37 See Coombs (1971); Young (1998).  
38 Then French Minister of Agriculture, M. Faure, quoted in Coombs (1971:194).  
  13of common solidarity vis-à-vis its colonies and territorial possessions.
39 The 
colonial bias thus inscribed was widened with the Accession of the UK in 1973, 
but not seriously challenged. For historical reasons, the African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) states came to enjoy privileged relationship with the EU, with 
special trade arrangements and commodity protocols ensuring these countries a 
preferential access to the EU market.  
 
The establishment of the agricultural policy was the result of a much more 
strategic series of decisions. Following the ravages of the Second World War, 
hunger and malnutrition were widespread in many parts of Europe
40, prompting 
governments to maintain or further develop national agricultural policies 
designed to boost production.
41 The national foundations of the future CAP were 
thus laid well in advance of the Treaty of Rome
42, which in Art. 38 (now art. 33) 
delineated the five key objectives of the new common policy:
43 1) to increase 
agricultural productivity; 2) to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers; 3) to 
stabilize markets; 4) to assure the availability of supplies; 5) to ensure that 
supplies reach consumer at reasonable prices. The CAP rested on three 
principles: A single market, community preference, and financial solidarity.
44 The 
instruments of the CAP reflected the reigning economic orthodoxy of the time: 
Target prices to boost agricultural production, intervention prices to secure a 
price floor, and export refunds to regulate the amount of eventual surplus 
                                                 
39 Hewitt & Whiterman (2004); Bretherton & Vogler (1999). 
40 Lind (2004:15) 
41 The widespread malnutrition was certainly not the only (or even the main) motive for developing national agricultural 
policies. Agricultural production has a number of specificities that have made it politically convenient to manage the 
development of the sector politically. See Nugent (2003:388ff) for a discussion.  
42 While the CAP has be the object of increasingly harsh criticism in recent years, it is worth recalling that it was 
originally developed as a replacement for the equally distorting and protective agricultural policies of the member states. 
See Rieger (2000) for an analysis.  
43  Peterson & Bomberg (1999:121).  
44 Nugent (2003:393-398); Kay (2003). .  
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The different policy fields are highly compartmentalised: They have their own 
Treaty provisions, their own Commissioners and Directorat Génèrales, their own 
working groups and their own functional Council of Ministers. They are in 
principle on a par: Trade is not superior to agriculture and development is not 
necessarily more important than trade. The institutional compartmentalisation 
and the fact that the different policies are pursuing different and partly 
conflicting goals, makes it difficult to ensure the overall coherence of EU external 
relations.
46 The trade policy of the Union is focused on bringing down trade 
barriers and creating global rules and institutions that will facilitate the 
operations of the global economy. The agricultural policy, on the other hand, is 
designed to negate the logic of the market economy; it is a political enclave in a 
free-market system.
47 Similarly, the development policy of the Union is supposed 
to promote poverty-reduction in the developing countries by, inter alia, 
furthering the integration into the international trade system. The trade and 
agricultural policies, on the other hand, serve to exclude competitive developing 
country exports (i.e. agricultural and labour-intensive products).These 
contradictions are not necessarily inherent and immutable. Nor are they 
necessarily particular to the EU. However, given the complexity of the EU as a 
political system, the absence of a central decision-maker, and the highly 
compartmentalized character of the sub-policy systems, these contradictions are 
                                                 
45 As the market prices in Europe are higher than on the world market, agricultural produce can only be exported from 
Europe by artificially bringing the selling price down through subsidies. Uncompetitive European producers are thus made 
competitive through public subsidies. In some cases, European exporters have been able to sell at prices below 
production costs in the developing countries (a practice normally referred to as dumping).    
46 See Nugent (2003).  
47 See Reiger (2000); Stevens (2000:425).  
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national level.
48  
 
This characterisation of the EU means that there are in fact several different – 
and equally legitimate – dispositions inside the EU. As an actor, the EU is 
fundamentally ambiguous: Its trade policy is a mixture of protectionism and 
principled liberalism; its development policy a mixture of historical discrimination 
(the ACP preferences) and an increasingly poverty focused rhetoric; its 
agricultural policy a mixture of production support, cultural policy, social and 
regional policy, and increasingly agro-industrial policy. In a foreign policy action 
such as the development of the EPA proposal, this implies that the EU has to go 
through a process of prioritization between legally equal goals and objectives: As 
a collective actor, it has to decide which dispositions are the more legitimate, and 
which dispositions should be allowed to inform the formulation of specific foreign 
policy actions.  
    
In the EPA case, three different sets of dispositions clashed.
49 The trade policy 
sub-system was predominantly liberal in its orientation, and focussed almost 
exclusively on the issue of WTO compatibility. This group was not intent on 
wasting valuable WTO bargaining chips on obtaining a new waiver. The 
agricultural policy sub-system had a traditional/conservative outlook, advising 
against rapid liberalisation of trade in agricultural products, and arguing in favour 
of a phased approach to market opening. The message emanating from the 
development policy sub-system was less clear: A majority was clearly in favour of 
                                                 
48 See Nugent (2003:438-440) for a discussion. See also the discussion in “What future for development assistance”, 
Action Aid (2004). Again, this should not be taken to imply that the external relations of national governments are free 
from contradictions, which they most evidently are not. However, in a national political context, it is in principle possible 
for the majority to prioritize between the policy objectives, e.g. compensating agricultural producers. In the EU this 
process of prioritization is more complicated: Why should British interests in a free-trade agreement, or Scandinavian 
notions of “Fair Trade” be given pre-eminence over Portuguese agricultural interests? 
49 See Pilegaard (2006) for a more detailed analysis.  
  16safeguarding the special relationship with the ACPs, but an increasingly vocal 
group was beginning to question the membership logic, arguing that EU 
development policy would be better served with a clear poverty orientation (i.e. 
focussing on the worlds Least Developed Countries, LDCs) instead of the ACPs. 
The internal negotiations saw the re-emergence of traditional cleavages between 
the regionalist , who favoured a continuation of the privileged relationship with 
the ACP countries, and globalists, who were more inclined to target trade 
preferences on the basis of a country’s level of development.
50
 
The final negotiation mandate of June 1998 reflected a broader political 
compromise between the different factions: On the surface, the privileged 
position of the ACP countries would be maintained, but on a regional basis 
through the creation of regional free trade agreements (based on reciprocity so 
as to ensure WTO compliance). At the same time, however, the poverty-
oriented member states managed to have a special provision inserted, 
specifying that all LDC’s would be given unlimited market access for essentially 
all products by 2005 at the latest.  
 
Given the power differential between the EU and the ACP countries, the final 
Cotonou Agreement of 2000 is by and large a reflection of the EU negotiation 
mandate. In the present context, the Cotonou Agreement has three important 
implications: 1) It gives pre-eminence to WTO compatibility; 2) It erodes the 
special status of the ACP group by a) splitting the group on a regional basis, 
and b) moving from non-reciprocity to reciprocity; and 3) It establishes in 
article 37(9) the political objective of granting the worlds LDCs unlimited 
market access.  
 
                                                 
50 See Posthumus (1998) for an overview. See also Forwood (2001). 
  17The Cotonou Agreement is probably best understood as a compromise text; not 
so much between the EU and the ACP, but internally, between different political 
coalitions in the Union and thus between different dispositions.
51 It is basically an 
agreement to defer substantial disagreements to a later date (just as the June 
1998 negotiation mandate had failed to present a clear and coherent vision for 
the future EU-ACP partnership). Cotonou is a framework agreement under which 
the details of the partnership have yet to be defined and agreed upon.
52 The 
Agreement represents a clear departure from the Lomé regime, but the ACP 
grouping is maintained as ‘partner’ and the transition phases offered will extend 
the remnants of the Lomé system well into the 21
st century. The trade provisions 
of the Cotonou Agreement are clearly influenced by the WTO agenda, and 
include what amounts to a ‘conformity clause’: Art.34.4 of the Cotonou 
Agreement thus stipulates that ‘Economic and trade co-operation shall be 
implemented in full conformity with WTO provisions’.
53
  
Step four: Structural factors constraining and enabling various dispositions 
As argued in the preceding section, the EPAs represent a compromise between 
different political objectives that are important in the EU political system. 
However, as compared to the Lomé regime, it is apparent that reciprocal trade 
liberalisation had gained prominence, while the development agenda seemed to 
been relegated to a less prominent position. This observation in turn prompts the 
following question: What structural factors enabled the dominance of the trade 
agenda, while weakening the influence of the development agenda?  
 
A tentative answer to this question is suggested by an analysis of structural 
changes in the trade and development policies of the EU. In the following it will 
                                                 
51 McQueen (1998:692). 
52 Bilal & van Hove (2002: 8); Babarinde & Faber (2004:35); 
Yu & Vig Jensen (2005:379); Bjørnskov & Krivonos 
(2001:2). 
  
53 Cotonou Agreement, Part 3, Title II, Article 34.4. See also Salama & Dearden (2001:19);  Raffer (2001:7).  
  18be argued that the prioritization embodied in the EPA proposal reflects a 
changing balance between the trade and the development policy of the EU.  
 
The European Union – and the European Community before it – has been a 
fairly committed advocate of global free trade,
54 and the EU’s stakes in the 
multilateral trade system have only become more important over the past 
decades. The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) has thus always had a 
prominent role in the EU, and the Uruguay Round, which resulted in the 
agreement to establish the WTO, broached a number of new policy fields that 
significantly strengthened the importance of the CCP. Where previous rounds of 
trade talks had focused mainly on lowering tariffs and reducing quantitative 
restrictions to trade, Uruguay significantly broadened the agenda to include 
trade in services, intellectual property rights, investments, and the extremely 
sensitive issues of agriculture and textiles.
55 Issues related to consumer 
welfare, environmental protection, and cross-border harmonisation became 
increasingly salient in multilateral trade diplomacy, which in turn made the 
content and conduct of the CCP all the more important.  
 
The EU has a strong interest in the so-called ‘Singapore issues’, which include 
issues like investment, transparency in government procurement, competition 
policy, and trade facilitation. These are the typical issues of the emerging trade 
agenda, which obviously differs markedly from the classical tariff and quota 
talks.
56 The EU is not alone in moving this agenda forward, but there are few 
natural allies.
57
                                                 
54 Dickson (2004:52); Young (2004:211-212); Hoeller, Girouard & Colecchia (1998). 
55 Jackson (1998:1-6); Young (2004:212); Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan (1998:35-38).   
56 Skjalm (2000:17ff).  
57 The agenda of the United States is narrower than the EU’s catalogue of demands, focussing mostly on trade 
liberalization in especially services and agriculture. Newly Industrialised countries and developing countries with high 
levels of exports (i.e. Brazil, Thailand) are still predominantly occupied with traditional merchandise trade, and generally 
opposed to the development of common standards on e.g. labour rights. 
  19 
During the same period, the EC/EU was embroiled in a number of GATT/WTO 
disputes, which clearly exposed some of the contradictions in the EC/EU’s trade 
policy. The discriminatory banana policy agreed to by the Council of Ministers in 
1993
58 was brought before a GATT panel at the behest of five Latin American 
banana exporting countries and the United States (which has significant 
economic interests in export of Latin American bananas)
59 in 1994, but the 
weak enforcement rules of the GATT system meant that the EU could in fact 
choose to disregard the verdict, which came out in favour of the plaintiffs.
60 
The new banana case initiated in 1996 under the WTO was pursued much more 
ruthlessly and determinedly on the part of the plaintiffs, and with the WTO’s 
new Dispute Settlement Understanding, the EU had to take the rulings more 
seriously.
61  
 
The increasing legalisation of international trade also increased pressure on the 
EU to revisit its discriminatory trade preferences. The Lomé Conventions had 
operated in a legal grey zone for several years. They were ipso facto a 
contravention of the GATT/WTO principles, in that they discriminated between 
developing countries.
62  According to Stevens, McQueen, and Kennan, the 
                                                 
58 Before the completion of the Internal Market, the different member states had entertained different national policies 
on trade in bananas, France, the UK, and Italy giving preference to ACP suppliers, Spain, Portugal and Greece protecting 
their limited national production, while other member states operated a mixed system of variable tariffs, which gave Latin 
American exporters a significant market share. In 1993, the Council of Ministers agreed to a compromise policy on 
bananas, which clearly discriminated in favour of the traditional ACP suppliers. See Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan 
(1998:16ff.) for an excellent overview. See also Stevens (2000a:408ff.). 
59 Wolf, J. (2000:40). See also Stevens, McQueen & Kennan (1998:18). 
60 The EU basically made a deal with the plaintiffs offering them slightly higher quotas in return for which they 
abandoned the case. See Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan (1998). See also Read (2001). 
61 Raffer (2001:11ff.); Wolf, J. (2000:40); Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan (1998:22). See also Cunningham & Lichtenbaum 
(2000:18) arguing that ‘[w]hile the WTO rules are still not enforceable in the sense of domestic court decisions… the new 
rules greatly increase the likelihood that a country will have to comply with an adverse decision.’ 
 
62 
The non-reciprocal trade preferences were only made available to the ACP countries, and could thus not be covered 
by the 1971 Enabling Clause, which only allows for preferential treatment in favour of all developing countries. See 
McQueen (1998:669); Bilal & van Hove (2002:7). Because Lomé was based on non-reciprocity, it could not be covered by 
  20banana dispute had two major impacts: It made it abundantly clear that the 
EU’s trade agreements would henceforth have to justified in the WTO, and ‘…it 
demonstrated that the WTO’s new, more muscular dispute settlement 
procedures could throw unwanted light into murky corners of EU policy and 
bring into question arrangements and understandings not directly related to the 
point at issue.’
63
 
In a 1997 Commission Communication entitled WTO Aspects of EU Preferential 
Trade Agreements with Third Countries
64 , then Trade Commissioner Leon 
Brittan tried to address some the salient issues raised by the interface between 
EU trade policy and the WTO. While the GATT Enabling Clause permits 
derogations from the common, non-discriminatory rules of the multilateral trade 
system, there are a number of conditions that have to be met: The state or 
group of states offering the concessions must either extend them to all 
developing countries or to all Least Developed Countries.
65 This principle may 
be overruled, however, if the preferential trade agreements are part of a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA).
66 In order to count as a FTA, the agreement has to be 
reciprocal and must cover ‘substantially all trade’. The Lomé Conventions 
satisfied neither requirement, which is why the EU and the ACP countries 
                                                                                                                                                 
art. XXIV concerning Free Trade Agreements either. The GATT/WTO rules can be read in a number of ways, but ‘[n]one 
provides a fully robust justification for the EU-ACP trade regime.’ See Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan (1998:vi; 92); 
Panagariya (2002a:5). The GATT working party which originally addressed the issue in 1976 could not find agreement 
and decided not to pursue the matter. In 1994, following a second review in the GATT, the EU implicitly acknowledged 
the illegality of the Lomé Covention by requesting a specific waiver from the GATT. See Huber (2000:429). 
63 Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan (1998:20).  
64 Reprinted in Agence Europe: Europe Documents no. 2025, 27th February 1997.  
65 In the GATT/WTO, the designation ‘developing country’ is a matter of self-selection and is not based on any objective 
indicators (as opposed to the designation LDC). When the GSP was first introduced by UNCTAD there was no agreement 
for a system of objective classification of beneficiary (developing) countries, relying instead on a system of self-selection: 
Countries that were part of the so-called “Group of 77” were ipso facto developing countries and therefore beneficiaries of 
the GSP. Economies in transition (i.e. the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states that 
emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union) are in principle eligible for preferential treatment under the GSP 
scheme. China, while not officially a development country, also receives preferential treatment. 
66 See Jackson (1998:54-57) for an overview of the rules.  
  21eventually applied for a waiver from the GATT.
67 The waiver was seen as a 
temporary solution and  Brittan’s Commu n i c a t i o n  l e f t  n o  d o u b t s  a s  t o  t h e  
potential problems facing the EU in this regard: ‘There is also the question 
whether EU agreements face a risk of challenge within the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System and (if they were successfully challenged) what the 
consequences would be for the agreement in question… The new WTO Dispute 
Settlement System involves a binding process which may lead to both 
unwelcome and unavoidable results. In the circumstances of a successful 
challenge, the Community may have to act in order to ensure compliance with 
its international obligations.’
68     
 
These tensions accentuated the dilemmas of EU trade policy. Under the 
leadership of DG Trade, the EU’s trade policy sub-system had positioned the EU 
as a champion of the GATT/WTO, but the EU could hardly assume a leading 
role in the new organisation by disregarding the rulings of the DSU or by 
perpetuating a waiver from the core principles of the trade system.
69 The 
operation of the new multilateral trade system was an important vehicle for the 
promotion and pursuit of key EU trade interests, but it was simultaneously 
challenging the traditional trade preferences of EU development policy.
70  
 
Turning to the development policy of the EU, important changes had also 
been underway for some years. As argued above, the Mid-Term Review of the 
                                                 
67 Technically speaking, an exemption from compliance with Art. I.1 of GATT. A waiver requires a 75 per cent majority of 
all contracting parties being in favour, and the waiver must be of fixed duration, subject to annual review.  
68 ‘WTO Aspects of EU Preferential Trade Agreements with Third Countries’, Reprinted in Agence Europe: Europe 
Documents no. 2025, 27th February 1997. 
69 See e.g. Bilal & van Hoven (2002:7); Ravenhill (2002:2). See also Dickson (2004:47) arguing that ‘…the transatlantic 
Banana dispute embodied the EU’s core dilemma of wanting to meet obligations towards the ACP countries while 
simultaneously satisfying a commitment to economic liberalism.’ 
70 As argued by John Ravenhill: ‘[t]he precipitant for the demise of the Lomé arrangements was a challenge to their 
legality within the WTO in the context of complaints from Central American Countries and the United States about the 
Conventions banana protocol.’ Ravenhill (2002:11)  
  22Lomé Convention in 1995 and the subsequent Green Paper tabled by the 
European Commission in 1996 suggested the need for a thorough reform of the 
existing policy. The non-reciprocal trade preferences of the Lomé Conventions 
had failed to create trade diversification and economic growth in the ACP 
countries, and were generally believed to be incompatible with the WTO’s 
principle of non-discrimination.
71 National differences notwithstanding, ‘…the 
need to redesign substantial parts of the Lomé Convention [was] not 
fundamentally disputed.’
72 Lomé was basically seen as a ‘product of the 
Seventies’, a relic from a world long gone.
73
 
In addition, few European commercial interests were actively speaking out in 
defence of the preferential relationship and those that did ‘…were decidedly ‘old 
economy’ and in many instances non-competitive enterprises dependent on the 
protection offered by Convention for their survival.’
74  Much stronger and more 
important trading interests had been threatened by the Lomé Convention and 
the criticism it had attracted from other trading partners. Ravenhill makes the 
point succinctly: ‘For leading European Companies and indeed most officials in 
European governments and the EU Commission itself, the idea that the WTO 
should come close to being wrecked and Europe engage in a trade war with the 
US over a dispute over banana imports was more than slightly ludicrous.’
75  
 
The Lomé Conventions had been the flagship of EU development cooperation. 
By the mid-1990’es, this partnership had lost momentum: The trade provisions 
of Lomé would appear to have done more harm than good, the ACP countries 
falling ever further behind in international trade. Disagreements emerged as to 
what would eventually succeed the Lomé Convention, and while the CCP was 
                                                 
71 Dickson (2004:46); McQueen (1998: 673); Ravenhill (2002:14). 
72 Posthumus (1998:2). See also Stevens, McQueen, & Kennan (1998).  
73 See Posthumus (1998). See also Lister (1997).  
74 Ravenhill (2002:13).  
75 Ravenhill (2002:14). See also Stevens, McQueen, Kennan (1998:v-vi) 
  23becoming increasingly important in the external relations of the EU, the existing 
development policy was gradually falling apart, with no clear alternative in 
sight. The development policy was hardly in a position to set the EU’s external 
relations agenda.  
 
Summary: Policy fragmentation and policy (in)coherence 
In the preceding analysis, the development of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements was analyzed by focusing on the motives and dispositions of the EU 
and the structural background. Starting from the structural changes, it was 
argued that the increasing saliency of the WTO agenda and the simultaneous 
break-down of the Lomé regime was a structural development that significantly 
strengthened the influence of the EU’s trade policy sub-system at the expense of 
the development policy sub-system. This is turn led to a changing balance 
between the different dispositions inside the EU: The dispositions of the trade 
policy sub-system had a stronger bearing on the development of the negotiating 
mandate than the dispositions of the either the agricultural or the development 
policy sub-systems. Ensuring WTO compatibility was consequently an important 
objective in launching the EPA proposal. Still, the other concerns and interests of 
the Union were articulated and did impact on the EU’s agenda, leading to a 
rather broad and potentially conflicting negotiation mandate. These lines of 
conflict – or tensions – are readily apparent in the current political debate over 
the EPA negotiations, where questions pertaining to the balance between the 
trade and development aspects continue to dominate the agenda.  
 
In this conceptualization of the EU as a political system, the lack of coherence 
between EU external policies is not just a technical detail or marginal error: It is 
a fundamental aspect of the system as such. Contradictions are built into the 
political system. They are not logical or necessary contradictions, but the product 
  24of specific historical contingencies.
76  However, according to Simon Nuttall, 
achieving greater consistency between the different policy fields is a daunting 
challenge in that ‘…solutions can only be found after a thorough and 
uncomfortable debate about the nature of foreign policy and the quality of the 
EU as an international actor.’
77 The coherence debate is not just a technical 
dossier; institutional engineering may strengthen co-operation and help identify 
conflicting interests, but it will not in itself resolve the political conflicts over 
prioritization.
78 A s  a r g u e d  b y  N e i l l  N u g e n t :  ‘ [ t ] he fact is that the consensual 
nature and the political differences that exist in the EU make it difficult to 
develop coordinated and coherent policies based on shared principles and agreed 
objectives.’
79  
 
The EPAs were supposed to be a key development instrument in the Cotonou 
Agreement, helping the ACP countries achieve stronger economic growth 
through a mixture of development assistance, regional integration, and trade 
expansion.  In that sense, they could be portrayed as an explicit effort to create 
a coherent and holistic approach to the development challenges facing the ACP 
countries.
80 In practice, however, the EU does not have the political uniformity of 
purpose or the institutional strength to ensure this level of policy coherence. At 
the end of the day, the people and the institutions tasked with the administration 
of the EU’s development policy do not have a mandate to make decisions that 
impinge on EU trade policy or the Common Agricultural Policy. Conversely, the 
                                                 
76 See Giddens (1995:310-319) on structural contradiction. See also Olsen (2000:21) arguing that in a political system as 
complex as the EU, institutional ‘…imbalances, collisions, and dynamics…’ are only to be expected. See also Schmieg 
(1997:36); Holland (2002:166) and Van Reisen (1999).   
77 Nuttall (2001:10).  
78 Pilegaard & Rasmussen (2006). A case in point would be the decision at the Seville Summit in 2002, to merge the 
Development and Foreign Affairs Council into the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). See Mackie 
(2003). In practice, the different formations of the Council still exist.  
79 Nugent (2003:329). See also Olsen (2000:21); Hoebink (2000:899-890; 2003:38); Schmieg (1997:40); Holland 
(2002:20); Koulaïmah-Gabriel & Oomen (1997).   
80 See also Salama & Dearden (2001). 
  25people that administer the EU’s trade policy have scant regard for the impact on 
third parties of the EU Common Commercial Policy. Political declarations on 
Policy Coherence for Development notwithstanding, the bottom line is that there 
is no clear hierarchy of priorities; only a continuous process of piecemeal 
prioritization, driven by the need to make decisions. There is, in other words, a 
danger that the EPAs will degenerate into ‘more of the same’: Some form of 
(temporary) trade preferences which do not include the most sensitive products 
coupled with a pot of money that is somehow additional to the European 
Development Fund.  
 
Interestingly, the like-minded EU countries have recently attempted to prevent 
this compartmentalisation by getting the EPA dossier up to a higher and more 
political level. By forcing through Council Conclusions that explicitly stress the 
importance of the development aspects (while downplaying the offensive trade 
interests of the Union), this grouping is attempting to encourage the process of 
prioritization, which had not been completed in the June 1998 negotiation 
mandate or in the subsequent Cotonou Agreement. It remains to be seen 
whether this strategy will prove successful. However, if it works this way 
(pushing the matter upwards), experience certainly shows that it works the other 
way too: The technical working groups of the EU that will have to flash out the 
practical operationalisation and implementation of the provisions of the EPAs 
have been known to water down the development aspects of other trade 
initiatives, and to some member states, they may well represent an additional 
line of defence.  
 
Reflections: The merits and limits of FPA in the study of EU external 
relations 
The present paper has tried to employ the integrative framework proposed by 
Walter Carlsnæs in order to develop an analysis of a specific EU foreign policy 
action. The EPA negotiations are a difficult challenge, in that they straddle a 
  26number of different policy sectors that have direct or indirect consequences for 
the EU’s external relations. On the other hand, the EPAs being more complex 
than a pure ‘CFSP’ decision, they may arguably provide more interesting insights 
as to the merits and limits of applying FPA in the analysis of EU external 
relations.  
 
Seen from one perspective, the FPA framework provides a reasonable 
explanation of the EPA initiative. Regardless of the fact that the EU is a collective 
actor – a consensual political decision-making system – authoritative decisions 
are ultimately made. The objectives motivating the development and adoption of 
the EPAs may have been varied, but the analysis nonetheless suggests that there 
was an overarching objective or motive, namely to get the EU’s relationship with 
the ACP countries back on a more solid platform.  
 
The second part of the analysis, the investigation of the causal relationships 
between dispositions and motives was somewhat more complicated, because the 
EU includes a number of different and partly conflicting dispositions. Still, it was 
possible to argue that the motives behind the specific foreign policy action 
reflected a dominant configuration of dispositions: Namely the importance of the 
multilateral trade system and the trade and development agenda. Irrespective of 
the partly conflicting dispositions inside the EU, certain dispositions were given 
preeminence over others: The EU essentially placed the WTO obligations over 
and above the traditional system of trade preferences.  
 
The final part of the analysis, the investigation of structural factors as 
constraining and enabling the dispositions of decision-makers, suggested that the 
specific prioritization embodied in the EPA initiative was in fact a reflection of 
structural changes in the different policies of the EU. The EU being a relatively 
open and competitive economy, it has a tremendous stake in the multilateral 
trade negotiations, and given the changing character of multilateral trade 
  27diplomacy, the EU was determined to shed the political liabilities of the 
“unlawful” lomé regime, and bring the relations with the ACP countries into 
compliance with the WTO. The collapse of the traditional policy of ACP 
preferentialism, as embodied in the Lomé Conventions, opened the way for the 
introduction of Regional Free Trade Agreements.  
 
The main drawback of the preceding analysis is arguably the fact that it merely 
suggests relations of causation without substantiating these. This flaw probably 
reflects the shortcomings of the present author (rather than an inherent 
limitation of the integrative framework), but it does nonetheless raise a number 
of pertinent questions as to the adequacy of the proposed explanation. The three 
dimensions of analysis are logical categories and as such clearly related. 
However, the relationship between the different dimensions is perhaps more 
contingent than the preceding analysis would suggest. 
 
Starting from the structural dimension, the changes in the EU’s different policies 
could arguably have ‘constrained and enabled’ other dispositions. A new waiver 
could arguably have been obtained, the EU and the ACP countries representing a 
sizeable grouping the WTO.  
 
Turning to the dispositional level and the intentional level, it would seem possible 
to argue that other foreign policy actions could have been developed on the 
basis of the dispositions that were identified. The relationship between the three 
levels is arguably more contingent than suggested by the preceding analysis. 
Again, this does not necessarily imply that Carlsnæs’ integrative framework is 
unsuitable for studying EU foreign policy actions, but it might suggest the need 
for even greater emphasis on the details of the policy process.
81 The structural 
and the dispositional levels clearly suggested some ‘fundamental tendencies’, but 
                                                 
81 Cf. White (2003).  
  28within this historically contingent space of structural determinism, actors do have 
substantial leeway to maneuver between the constraints and opportunities that 
are manifest at any given point in time. This is not necessarily unique for the EU, 
but given the complexity of the EU political system and the fact that there is no 
overarching, authoritative decision-maker, the process-level is arguably all the 
more important.  
 
Adding a richer conceptualization of the policy process to the three analytical 
dimensions suggested by Carlsnæs might improve the explanatory relevance of 
the framework, without significantly weakening its conceptual clarity.         
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